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STUDENT LOAN DISCHARGE: REEVALUATING UNDUE 
HARDSHIP UNDER A PRESUMPTION OF 
CONSISTENT USAGE 
ABSTRACT 
An increasing number of Americans are suffering from financial distress 
caused by educational debt. Some of those individuals seek relief from that 
distress through the bankruptcy system, where they must establish that repaying 
their educational debt would impose an undue hardship in order to obtain a 
discharge of such debt. The focus of this Comment is § 523(a)(8) of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, which sets forth educational debt as an exception to 
bankruptcy discharge unless the repayment of student loan obligations imposes 
an “undue hardship.” In drafting this section, Congress did not define the term 
“undue hardship,” thereby empowering the courts to determine what constitutes 
undue hardship and the circumstances that deserve forgiveness of educational 
debt. As a result, courts have developed a variety of tests to provide a framework 
for determining whether a debt should be dischargeable.  
Congress’s decision to condition the relief of educational loans on the 
application of a vague and indeterminate standard has proved to be problematic 
for various reasons. One solution, not yet discussed by courts and 
commentators, is to look to other federal statutes and regulations implementing 
the undue hardship standard to evaluate the application of the standard and 
consider how those applications can inform the undue hardship analysis in the 
bankruptcy context.  
By evaluating the undue hardship standard in the context of public benefits, 
employment discrimination, financial aid eligibility, tax payment extensions, 
and discovery in civil procedure, this Comment supports the conclusion that the 
primary inquiry into a debtor’s undue hardship claim must focus on the debtor’s 
current financial circumstances without undue regard to pre-bankruptcy 
conduct or assurance of persisting financial distress. Any definition Congress 
provides to “undue hardship” in § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code should 
include factors that evaluate the future livelihood of the debtor if she is denied 
bankruptcy relief based on the debtor’s current financial circumstances. 
INTRODUCTION 
Student loan debt in the United States has been on a continual rise becoming 
the second highest consumer debt category with more than forty-four million 
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borrowers holding over one and a half trillion dollars in student loan debt.1 This 
figure represents more than two and a half times the amount of student loan debt 
owed just a decade earlier.2 These are the statistics driving the literature 
describing the student loan debt crisis, a crisis driven by rising tuition rates that 
exceed student financial aid and family income necessary to cover educational 
costs, forcing students to rely on student loans to finance higher education.3 
Educational loan borrowers have increasingly found themselves unable to repay 
their student loans as indicated by student loan default rates, resulting in negative 
effects to an individual’s financial well-being and leading to financial distress.4 
While there are many potential solutions to the rising costs of tuition and 
resulting dependency on student loans, this Comment views bankruptcy as one 
solution to the financial distress that students with burdensome student loans 
face because of the policy objectives driving bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law is 
a statutory mechanism for individuals and entities burdened by financial 
obligations to discharge their debts.5 Two main public policy objectives govern 
the purpose behind bankruptcy law. First, bankruptcy provides a mechanism for 
creditor repayment through a liquidation process or through a repayment plan.6 
Second, debtors receive relief from creditors and obtain a fresh financial start 
that is unburdened by the pressure and struggles of onerous pre-existing debts.7  
The focus of my Comment is § 523(a)(8) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 
which determines a debtor’s ability to discharge student loan debt if the 
repayment of student loan obligations imposes an “undue hardship.”8 My 
Comment examines the impact of Congress’s decision to delegate the task of 
interpreting the undue hardship exception to the judiciary and argues that the 
statutory interpretation tool of consistent usage provides a viable means for 
 
 1 Zack Friedman, Have Student Loans Caused A Drop In Home Ownership?, FORBES, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/01/18/student-loans-home-ownership/#28d2596c3d22 (Jan. 
18, 2019, 8:32 AM).  
 2 Anthony Cilluffo, 5 Facts About Student Loans, Pew Research Center (Aug. 24, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/24/5-facts-about-student-loans/. 
 3 Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, College Costs Rising Faster than Financial Aid, Report Says, WASHINGTON 
POST (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/10/26/college-costs-rising-
faster-than-financial-aid-report-says/?utm_term=.5904ff3b13a4. 
 4 Press Release, U.S. Department of Education Releases National Student Loan FY 2014 Cohort Default 
Rate (Sept. 27, 2017); see also William Elliott & Melinda Lewis, Student Debt Effects on Financial Well-Being: 
Research and Policy Implications, 29 J. ECON. SURVS. 614, 624 (2015). 
 5 Robert B. Milligan, Putting an End to Judicial Lawmaking: Abolishing the Undue Hardship Exception 
for Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 221, 224 (2000). 
 6 See id. at 225. 
 7 Id. at 225–26. 
 8 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018).  
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reinterpreting the phrase “undue hardship” to create a consistent and fair 
standard to help courts determine whether a student debtor’s circumstance 
constitutes undue hardship that necessitates discharge of the educational debt. 
My research involves researching relevant federal statutes and regulations to 
determine how the phrase “undue hardship” is interpreted and applied to 
determine whether that definition and application can inform courts on how the 
standard may be used in the context of student loan discharge proceedings to 
create consistent treatment of student-loan debtors.  
First, this Comment provides background on the evolution of student loan 
programs and the bankruptcy system. Next, this Comment provides the legal 
doctrine behind tools of statutory construction, including the presumption of 
consistent usage, that I use to support the concept of looking across federal laws 
to discern common threads among the way undue hardship is interpreted and 
applied to help inform the use of the standard in the bankruptcy context. My 
Comment then analyzes the various federal provisions using the undue hardship 
standard by describing the provisions, analyzing case law decisions interpreting 
the standard, and discerning key points that can be used to inform the use of the 
standard in determining whether student loans may be discharged in bankruptcy. 
Finally, this Comment proposes some important policy considerations that 
support the idea that the undue hardship standard in the bankruptcy context 
needs to be reevaluated by circuit courts that are continually faced with the 
decision of what constitutes an undue hardship to warrant the discharge of 
student loan debt. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Student loan programs were originally intended as a program of last resort 
for college students seeking to finance their education, and only the most needy 
students qualified for a loan.9 The purpose surrounding the creation of the first 
student loan programs, around the time of Lyndon Johnson’s “war on poverty,” 
was to reduce financial barriers and overcome the equalities of opportunity 
among potential college enrollees.10 The result was widespread demand for 
additional student financial aid, which Congress responded to by enacting the 
Middle Income Student Assistance Act, which made federal student loans 
available to students with less regard to need.11 Among other expansions of 
 
 9 Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 
501, 504 (2000). 
 10 Id. at 505. 
 11 Id. 
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student financial aid programs and policy, student borrowing rates increased 
drastically. The evolution of student loan programs and the impact that it had on 
cost and accessibility of higher education is responsible for creating the so-called 
“Indentured Generation” of student borrowers, a nickname that scholars have 
given students that will likely be burdened with student loan debt for much of 
their lives.12  
Around the same time Congress was expanding the student loan program, 
Congress also began the process of ending the opportunity to discharge student 
loan debt through bankruptcy due to fears of bankruptcy abuse by student 
debtors.13 Prior to the current Bankruptcy Code, student loans were not treated 
differently from any other dischargeable debt. The practice changed with the 
passage of the Education Amendments Act of 1976, which prohibited discharge 
of student loans in bankruptcy for the first five years of loan repayment unless 
the debtor could establish undue hardship.14 The 1978 Bankruptcy Code 
endorsed the five-year bar against discharge of student debt.15 In 1990, the 
student loan discharge exception was extended to seven years. 16 Then, in 1998, 
the Code was amended so that federally guaranteed student loans could not be 
discharged unless the debtor could prove undue hardship.17 With this historical 
context in mind, tension continues to exist between federal student aid programs 
that encourage students to borrow to access to higher education, and federal 
bankruptcy law that characterize educational debts as an exception to the general 
rule that discharge forgives pre-bankruptcy debts, unless the educational debts 
impose undue hardship. 
Under the current provision governing the discharge of educational loans, a 
debtor availing herself of the bankruptcy system must establish that repaying her 
educational debt would impose an undue hardship in order to obtain a discharge 
of such debt.18 An important consideration by a student loan borrower who 
wishes to discharge pre-bankruptcy educational debts is what she must show to 
make a claim of undue hardship. The relevant provision, however, does not 
provide a definition or standard to explain what constitutes an “undue hardship” 
that warrants discharge of educational loans.19 The legislative history of the 
 
 12 Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 329, 330–31 (2013). 
 13 Roots, supra note 9, at 512. 
 14 Austin, supra note 12, at 363. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 363–64. 
 17 Id. at 364. 
 18 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
 19 Id. § 523(a)(8). 
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section also fails to precisely specify how courts should determine whether a 
debtor qualifies for a discharge based on an undue hardship.20 The task of 
interpreting undue hardship and establishing the conditions that warrant the 
discharge of educational loans has consequently fallen to the federal judiciary. 
As a result, courts have developed a variety of tests to provide a framework for 
determining whether an individual’s educational debt may be discharged.21 
Amidst these varying tests, courts have disagreed regarding the threshold for 
when an education loan obligation is an undue hardship and what exactly what 
a debtor must prove in order to discharge a student loan on undue hardship 
grounds.22 
The vast majority of courts, including nine of the country’s thirteen federal 
circuit courts, have interpreted “undue hardship” to require the debtor to prove 
three things:  
(1) the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, 
a “minimal” standard of living for himself and his dependents if forced 
to repay the loans; (2) additional circumstances exist indicating that 
the debtor’s inability to pay is likely to persist for a significant portion 
of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) the debtor has 
made good faith efforts to repay the loans.23  
The debtor must prove each of these elements by a preponderance of the 
evidence.24 This standard is commonly referred to as the “Brunner test” after the 
case in which the standard first originated. The Brunner test is considered highly 
fact-intensive, and not all courts apply the standard the same way.25 For 
 
 20 Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 487, 419–28 (2005). 
 21 See Johnson v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Johnson), 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11428 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979), Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Services Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 
B.R. 752 (1985), Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1987), Simons v. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Simons), 119 B.R. 589, 592–93 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1990) (taking a totality-of-the-circumstances-approach); see also Robert F. Salvin, Student Loans, 
Bankruptcy and the Fresh Start Policy: Must Debtors be Impoverished to Discharge Educational Loans?, 71 
TUL. L. REV. 139, 149 (1996) (stating there are as many tests for undue hardship as there are bankruptcy courts). 
 22 Kevin Lewis, Bankruptcy and Student Loans, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 1 (Feb. 
22, 2018). 
 23 Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d at 396. 
 24 Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 358–59 (6th Cir. 2007); Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 25 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Buchanan, 276 B.R. 744, 752 (N.D. W. Va. 2002); see Hicks v. Educ. 
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 30 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (arguing that even though “both the 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits” have purportedly “adopted identical versions of the Brunner test,” “the Brunner 
test as adopted by the Eleventh Circuit does not include the same considerations as the Brunner test adopted by 
the Tenth Circuit”). 
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example, many courts find that hardship must go beyond the ordinary hardship 
of a debtor in bankruptcy.26 Many courts focus on the predicted length of the 
hardship.27 Others have held that hardship must be truly severe and prolonged 
to warrant discharge.28 There are courts, however, that view the requisite 
hardship in a less demanding sense. Two have recently concluded that the 
hardship inquiry is whether the debtor has adequate resources to repay the loan 
and maintain a minimum standard of living.29 What results from the Brunner 
test, and many others used to determine what constitutes an “undue hardship,” 
is variance in the extent of the hardship required to obtain relief. 
Congress’s decision to condition educational loan relief on the application 
of a vague and indeterminate standard has proven to be problematic for many 
reasons. It is recognized that there is “a troubling disconnect between the 
 
 26 Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 245 B.R. 731, 743 (2000) (citing United Student Aid Funds v. Pena (In 
re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998)) (“garden variety” hardship not enough); Law v. Educ. Res. Inst. 
(In re Law), 159 B.R. 287, 291 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993) (“Despite its discretionary nature, the interpretation [of 
undue hardship under a totality of the circumstances approach] does, nonetheless, contemplate the existence of 
unique and extraordinary circumstances, for the fact that repayment would merely impose a hardship is 
insufficient”); Ford v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Ford), 151 B.R. 135, 138–40 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) 
(“describing standards of hardship that go beyond “mere financial hardship or present financial adversity”); In 
re Lohman, 79 B.R. 576, 584 (D. Vt. 1987) (debtor’s circumstances must be “exceptional and extreme”). 
 27 Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 245 B.R. at 743 (citing Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 
831 F.2d 395, 396 (“Requiring evidence not only of current inability to pay but also of additional, exceptional 
circumstances, strongly suggestive of continuing inability to repay over an extended period of time, more reliably 
guarantees that the hardship presented is ‘undue.’”); accord Barrows v. Ill. Student Assistance Comm’n (In re 
Bush Barrows), 182 B.R. 640, 648 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994); see also Dresser v. Univ. of Me. (In re Dresser), 33 
B.R. 63, 65 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983) (debtor must demonstrate that for the foreseeable future it would be impossible 
for him to generate enough income to “pay off” the loan and maintain his household “above the poverty level”). 
 28 Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 245 B.R. at 743 (citing Wetzel v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. 
Corp. (In re Wetzel), 213 B.R. 220, 225 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (“There must be an extraordinary situation 
with a certainty of hopelessness as to any possibility of repayment for the indefinite future. Mere inconvenience, 
austere budget, financial difficulty and inadequate present employment are not grounds for discharging 
educational debts [for undue hardship]”); In re Mathews, 166 B.R. at 943, 945 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994) (by using 
“undue” as a modifier, Congress “meant that ordinary ‘garden variety’ hardship would not suffice,” the debtor 
“must show that the combination of the low income and exceptional circumstances is so severe and oppressive 
that there is no way that the debtor will ever be able to repay the debt and maintain a minimal standard of living”); 
In re Rappaport, 16 B.R. 615, 617 (Bankr. D.N.J.) (requiring “total incapacity now and in the future to pay one’s 
debts for reasons not within the control of the individual debtor”). See also Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency 
v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305–06 (3rd Cir. 1995) (debtor entitled to live in something more than “abject 
poverty,” must show “she could not maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay her loans” which is 
a showing of something more than “tight finances”)). 
 29 Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 245 B.R. at 744 (citing Peel v. Salliemae Servicing-Heal Loan (In re 
Peel), 240 B.R. 387, 394–95 (1999)); Salinas v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Salinas), 240 B.R. 305, 
313 (lamenting that too many courts “discuss ‘undue hardship’ in the most stringent of terms, focusing not upon 
whether the debtor possesses an ‘adequate’ income but rather whether the debtor is scraping by on a ‘minimal’ 
standard of living); see also Doherty v. United States Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Doherty), 219 B.R. 665, 671 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 1998) (arguing that In re Brunner does not require a “certainty of hopelessness” standard, basing its 
finding on “the most probable near-future for a debtor”). 
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original purpose of the student-loan program to democratize American higher 
education and the fiscal policies that are necessary to ensure program solvency 
and protect borrowers from enslaving debt and inevitable default.”30 The undue 
hardship standard in the exceptions to discharge provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code has also been deemed “unworkable” because of how inconsistent results 
are when judges apply the exception.31 Inconsistent judicial determinations of 
undue hardship are problematic because of the way they undermine the 
uniformity and efficiency of bankruptcy law.32 Accordingly, there is a pressing 
need for a reevaluation of the standard courts use to determine the 
dischargeability of student loans in bankruptcy. 
Two issues tend to arise in the debate over providing debt forgiveness relief 
in general to individuals: (1) the ability of a debtor to repay her pre-bankruptcy 
debts due to the concern that bankruptcy should be limited from those with a 
means to repay and (2) the causes of the debtor’s financial situation that resulted 
in the debtor filing for bankruptcy due to concern that the debtor’s situation 
stems from irresponsible conduct instead of true misfortune.33 Scholarly 
research and case law provide evidence that courts have focused on the latter 
issue in conducting their undue hardship determinations, which has resulted in a 
focus on the cause of the financial hardship instead of the effect that declaring 
the debt nondischargeable would have on the debtor.34 This Comment adopts the 
argument advanced by Professor Rafael Pardo and Professor Michelle Lacey 
that the undue hardship inquiry in the bankruptcy context should be confined to 
an inquiry into a debtor’s ability to repay educational debt without reference to 
the debtor’s prebankruptcy conduct, as such consideration of such conduct is 
unnecessary to the discharge analysis.35 This Comment expands on this 
argument by looking to other federal law implementing the undue hardship 
standard to discern a more coherent approach to interpreting and applying undue 
hardship for purposes of determining whether educational debt ought to be 
deemed dischargeable in bankruptcy. The phrase “undue hardship” does not 
represent a complete gray area in the law without any guideposts about how to 
rule. Determining the proper statutory construction of the phrase “undue 
hardship” is a necessary step in determining the meaning of undue hardship that 
 
 30 Robert C. Cloud & Richard Fossey, Facing the Student Debt Crisis: Restoring the Integrity of the 
Federal Student Loan Program, 40 J. C. & U. L. 467, 496 (2014). 
 31 Milligan, supra note 5, at 254. 
 32 Id. at 258 n. 244 (2000) (citing NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS: FINAL 
REPORT, 1.4.5, chapter 5 (1997) (stating that bankruptcy law should treat debtors uniformly)). 
 33 Pardo & Lacey, supra note 20, at 510. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
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reflects congressional intent and continuity in the law of the undue hardship 
standard that courts should recognize and use in the discharge of student loan 
debt.36 
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION DOCTRINE 
“Undue hardship” is a widely used and accepted phrase in a variety of federal 
laws. Determining the proper statutory meaning of the phrase “undue hardship” 
as used in the Bankruptcy Code can be aided by the use of various tools and 
methods of statutory interpretation to analyze and synthesize the various other 
federal provisions using the phrase “undue hardship.” Both judges and scholars 
have developed an arsenal of interpretative techniques designed to extract the 
functional meaning from ambiguous statutory text and conflicting legislative 
history. By using these interpretative techniques, judges faced with the challenge 
of construing legislative text and history can render consistent interpretations.37  
Statutory interpretation begins with an unclear or ambiguous term or phrase 
as determined by statutory construction.38 It is a well known rule that courts 
cannot interpret a statute that is clear and unambiguous.39 Ambiguity arises when 
“a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons 
in two or more different senses.”40 Once deemed ambiguous, formal legal 
analysis views ambiguity as an opportunity to problem solve rather than an 
opportunity to exploit.41 When encountering ambiguity, a cardinal rule of 
construction is that the “whole statute should be drawn upon as necessary, with 
its various parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context in a 
manner that furthers statutory purpose.”42 This rule was articulated by Justice 
Scalia in United Savings Association v. Timbers: 
 
 36 See generally Brief of Amici Curiae National Consumer Law Center And National Association Of 
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Murphy v. U.S. Dept. of Education, No. 14-1691 (1st Cir. Oct. 25, 2016). 
 37 Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value Of 
Ambiguity In Statutory Design And Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2002). 
 38 Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“We begin with 
the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the 
statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be 
regarded as conclusive.”); Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“In interpreting a statute 
a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others. . . . Courts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”). 
 39 Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. at 254 (“when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, 
this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”). 
 40 In re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 41 Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 37, at 642. 
 42 Larry Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, Congressional Research 
Service, at 4 (2011); see also United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 
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Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may 
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the 
statutory scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in 
a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the 
permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible 
with the rest of the law.43 
When a statute is deemed ambiguous and interpretation of the statute is 
necessary beyond any finding of a “plain or ordinary meaning,” the intent of the 
legislature must be examined and consulted, and the statute must be construed 
accordingly. Legislative history can provide guidance for determining the 
legislature’s intent and therefore the meaning of ambiguous language in a 
statute.44 The idea of focusing on the meaning that the legislature intended to 
give the statute is often referred to as intentionalism and is touted as “facilitating 
healthy interbranch relations” by promoting commonality between the 
legislature and the judiciary.45 Legislative history, however, is not always 
conclusive. 
In the event that history lacks indication of Congress’s intended 
interpretation of an ambiguous term, there are a series of canons of interpretation 
that can be used throughout the process to help justify and provide support for a 
particular interpretation of a statute.46 These statutory interpretation tools serve 
as “rules of thumb or presumptions” that help uncover substantive meaning 
from, for example, the language, context, structure, and subject matter of a 
statute.47 While Black’s Law Dictionary does not treat canons as common law, 
stating that canons are treated “as mere as customs not having the force of law,” 
these customs have had a substantial influence in ascertaining what the drafters 
of a statute meant.48  
Canons important to this Comment include the “whole act rule” which 
provides that the entirety of a document (in this case, the Bankruptcy Code) 
provides context for each of its parts. Therefore, this canon establishes that when 
construing a statute, the text of the entire statute as a whole must be considered, 
 
(1988); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing how 
courts also may look to the broader body of law into which the enactment fits). 
 43 United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). 
 44 A Guide To Reading, Interpreting And Applying Statutes, WRITING CTR. AT GEO. U.L. CTR., at 9, 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/legal-writing-scholarship/writing-center/ 
upload/A-Guide-to-Reading-Interpreting-and-Applying-Statutes.pdf. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See generally id. 
 47 Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 344 (2010). 
 48 Id. at 345. 
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which is important when the ambiguous term or phrase one is trying to 
understand is also used elsewhere in the statute.49 Another important canon 
includes the presumption of consistent usage, which presumes that a word or 
phrase has the same meaning throughout a text. This canon is also referred to as 
in pari materia and allows a court to assume that when two statutes use the same 
vocabulary to discuss the same or similar subject matter, the legislature intended 
the terms to have the same meaning.50 These canons operate on the presumption 
that legislative bodies use the same term consistently. Additionally, the related-
statutes canon purports that statutes dealing with the same subject are to be 
interpreted together, as though they were on law.51 In certain areas, 
interpretations are recognized to cut across statutes. Another similar canon of 
construction, the common law of extrinsic sources, permits interpreters to look 
for meaning beyond a code’s text.52 This canon embraces the idea of “continuity 
in law” and looking to sources outside the statute at issue to help discern 
meaning or intent.53 With this brief foundation, I will now turn to an analysis of 
the phrase “undue hardship” as used across the federal code using the principles 
and canons discussed in this section to clarify the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8) for determining whether a debtor’s economic status meets a 
threshold that supports a discharge of burdensome student loan debt. 
III. UNDUE HARDSHIP ANALYSIS 
The undue hardship standard as interpreted by a majority of the circuit courts 
includes, in part, an inquiry into whether a debtor will maintain a future inability 
to repay the student loan and has made good faith efforts to repay the loan in 
order to receive a discharge of student loan debt.54 Judges tend to measure a 
debtor’s good faith by her “efforts to obtain employment, maximize income, and 
minimize expenses.”55 Additionally, some courts consider whether the debtor 
has participated in alternative loan repayment options.56 Regardless, all of these 
measurements of good faith effort focus on the debtor’s prebankruptcy conduct, 
which essentially leads to an inquiry into why the debtor is in financial distress 
 
 49 See Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 200 (3rd Cir. 1998).  
 50 Scott, supra note 47, at 376. 
 51 See Larry Eig, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, General Principles and Recent Trends 15 (2014). 
 52 Larry Eig, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, General Principles and Recent Trends (2011). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2nd Cir. 1987); Roe v. Law 
Unit (In re Roe), 226 B.R. 258, 274 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (finding that the debtor did not establish sufficient good 
faith in claiming undue hardship under the Johnson test).  
 55 Austin, supra note 12, at 379. 
 56 Id. 
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and how their prebankruptcy conduct contributed to their current financial state. 
Congress, however, has clearly indicated elsewhere in the federal code that it 
knows how to incorporate good faith, or an inquiry into an individual’s conduct, 
as a condition that is separate and distinct from the condition of undue hardship 
for purposes of determining whether an undue hardship exists.57 Accordingly, 
the interpretation of undue hardship used by a majority of the circuit courts in 
bankruptcy proceedings means that courts interpret the phrase “undue hardship” 
differently for purposes of evaluating the dischargeability of educational loans 
compared to how the standard is used and analyzed throughout other provisions 
of the U.S. Code. This interpretation is a direct contradiction to the well-
established canon of the presumption of consistent usage, which suggests that a 
word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text.58 My 
analysis will now look to the other uses of the undue hardship standard in the 
Bankruptcy Code and the U.S. Code to establish that an undue hardship inquiry 
should focus on the effect that the claimed hardship is having on the individual 
based on the individual’s current circumstances and the implications for an 
individual if their claim for relief based on the undue hardship is rejected. 
A. Reaffirmation Agreements in the Bankruptcy Code 
In the Bankruptcy Code, the use of the undue hardship standard in the 
reaffirmation agreement provision suggests that the undue hardship analysis 
should primarily focus on the current financial circumstances of a debtor. As 
acknowledged by scholars, the reaffirmation agreement provision is the only 
other place undue hardship appears in the Bankruptcy Code besides in the 
educational loan context.59 Under 11 U.S.C. § 524, the provision governing 
reaffirmation agreements, an agreement that makes the debtor legally bound to 
repay a debt that would otherwise be discharged is enforceable only if a variety 
of requirements meant to safeguard the debtor’s fresh start are all satisfied.60  
Among these requirements includes language that the agreement must “not 
impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.”61 The 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) 
 
 57 Brief for Professor Rafael Pardo as Amicus Curiae, p., Murphy v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., No. 14-1691 
(1st Cir. Oct. 25, 2016). 
 58 See A Guide To Reading, Interpreting And Applying Statutes, supra note 44; Scott, supra note 47, at 
376. 
 59 See Brief for Professor Rafael Pardo as Amicus Curiae, p. 11–13, Murphy v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., No. 
14-1691 (1st Cir. Oct. 25, 2016). 
 60 11 U.S.C. § 524(m)(1). 
 61 Id. 
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clarified the “undue hardship” standard in the reaffirmation agreement context 
by providing that a presumption of undue hardship arises in the reaffirmation 
context if the debtor’s disposable income, measured by income level minus 
expenses, is not enough to make the payments as required in the reaffirmation 
agreement.62 If the presumption arises, it can be rebutted only if the debtor is 
able to identify additional funding that will allow him or her to make the 
scheduled payments per the agreement.63 Accordingly, the provision focuses on 
the debtor’s ability to repay a debt determined by the debtor’s disposable 
income, which ultimately measures the effect that the reaffirmation agreement 
would have on the future livelihood of the debtor. 
While the Bankruptcy Code itself sheds some light on what the undue 
hardship standard means, it is worth looking beyond it to other provisions of 
federal code that apply the undue hardship standard to discern a more coherent 
approach to interpreting and applying the standard for purposes of § 523(a)(8) 
in the Bankruptcy Code. By analyzing the undue hardship standard in the context 
of public safety benefits, employment discrimination, student financial aid 
eligibility, tax payment extensions, social security benefits, and discovery in 
civil litigation, common threads exist that suggest that an evaluation of good 
faith or conduct in general in an undue hardship analysis is misguided. In fact, 
other federal law provides strong support for the conclusion that Congress 
intended undue hardship to focus on the impact or affect an alleged hardship is 
having on an individual rather than evaluating the cause of the hardship, whether 
an individual has made a good faith effort to avoid their hardship, and whether 
the hardship will persist. 
B. Public Safety Officer Death Benefits 
When it comes to considering an individual’s conduct for purposes of 
granting relief, Congress has clearly indicated in federal law that it knows how 
to expressly incorporate good faith as a condition that is separate and distinct 
from the condition of undue hardship for purposes of granting relief.64 A prime 
example of this is found in the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act, which 
established a program to provide death benefits or disability benefits to certain 
public safety officers whose death or disability occurred in the line of duty.65 
The provision, 34 U.S.C. § 10281(m), which contains the phrase undue 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Brief for Professor Rafael Pardo as Amicus Curiae, p. 11–13, Murphy v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., No. 
14-1691 (1st Cir. Oct. 25, 2016). 
 65 34 U.S.C. § 10281(m). 
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hardship, concerns collection actions of benefits that are disbursed pursuant to a 
statute enacted retroactively or in error, and reads in whole as follows: “The 
Bureau may suspend or end collection action on an amount disbursed pursuant 
to a statute enacted retroactively or otherwise disbursed in error under subsection 
(a) or (c) of this section, where such collection would be impractical, or would 
cause undue hardship to a debtor who acted in good faith.”66 In other words, an 
undue hardship serves as a defense against collection actions for benefits 
disbursed in error or benefits disbursed under a statute enacted retroactively. 
Undue hardship in this context has not been interpreted in case law, 
regulations, or guidance policy, but is worth noting due to the construction of 
the statute. The fact that Congress placed “undue hardship” in conjunction with 
the clause “acted in good faith” in the same provision suggests that when 
Congress uses on the term “undue hardship,” it should not include a good faith 
requirement. This conclusion is supported by the rule against surplusage, which 
is a presumption that the legislature put every word in the statute for a reason. 
The rule against surplusage is regarded as “a cardinal principle of statutory 
construction” and stands for the proposition that “a statue ought, upon the whole, 
to be construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be 
superfluous, void, or insignificant.”67 In other words, a statute should not be 
interpreted in a way that renders a word or phrase superfluous when such an 
interpretation can be avoided.68 If the undue hardship standard were to include 
an inquiry into good faith, the latter half of § 10281(m) using the clause “acted 
in good faith” would be insignificant, if not wholly superfluous, since the undue 
hardship analysis would already include an inquiry into the good faith of the 
debtor. The Supreme Court has made clear, it is “reluctant to treat statutory terms 
as surplusage” in any setting.”69 This example of statutory construction that 
makes an express distinction between undue hardship and good faith provides 
strong support for the conclusion that a definition for undue hardship in the 
bankruptcy context should not include factors that evaluate good faith efforts or 
debtor’s pre-bankruptcy conduct.  
 
 66 Id.  
 67 Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). 
 68 United States v. e-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 82, 93 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 69 Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. at 174; see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 
515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994) (“judges should hesitate 
to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting). 
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C. Employment Discrimination  
The application of the undue hardship standard as a defense for an employer 
who cannot make accommodations for an employee also supports the conclusion 
that an undue hardship analysis should focus on an individual’s current 
circumstances. An analysis of how the undue hardship standard is interpreted 
and applied in the employment discrimination context shows that an undue 
hardship analysis is distinct from an analysis evaluating good faith or persisting 
financial hardship. Out of all the provisions undue hardship is used in federal 
law, both Congress and the Supreme Court have been most generous in shedding 
some light on what the undue hardship standard means in the context of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The undue hardship standard is 
included in the ADA as a defense against accommodating an employee’s 
disability.70 Specifically, the statute provides that discriminating:  
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability includes not 
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who 
is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
on the operation of the business of such covered entity.71  
The regulation implementing the law further clarifies the undue hardship 
standard as used in this employment context by providing a definition to undue 
hardship. According to 29 CFR 1630.2, “undue hardship means, with respect to 
the provision of an accommodation, significant difficulty or expense incurred by 
a covered entity, when considered in light of the factors set forth in . . . this 
section.”72  
 In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on a covered entity, a summary of the factors laid out in the regulation 
include the nature and net cost of the accommodation, overall financial resources 
of the facility and effect on expenses and resources, the overall financial 
resources of the covered entity, the type of operations of the covered entity, and 
the impact on the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including 
the impact on the facility’s ability to conduct business.73 The U.S. Equal 
 
 70 See Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L. R. 1, 2–3 (1990). 
 71 42 U.S.C § 12112. 
 72 29 CRF 1630.2.  
 73 Id. (“In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, 
factors to be considered include: (i) The nature and net cost of the accommodation needed under this part, taking 
into consideration the availability of tax credits and deductions, and/or outside funding; (ii) The overall financial 
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Employment Opportunity Commission has issued guidance that sheds further 
light on the standard, defining “undue hardship” to mean “significant difficulty 
or expense” and directs an undue hardship inquiry focus on the resources and 
circumstances of the particular employer in relationship to the cost or difficulty 
of providing a specific accommodation.74 
Since the undue hardship is used as a defense to accommodating an 
employee’s disability, an employer must carry the burden of proof in showing a 
court that making a requested reasonable accommodation poses an undue 
hardship.75 The court’s inquiry into whether the defense is allowable follows this 
systematic analysis: If the employee establishes that a reasonable 
accommodation is possible, then the employer must prove that the 
accommodation is unreasonable and imposes an “undue hardship” on the 
employer.76 It is the first part of this analysis, the establishment of a “reasonable 
accommodation,” that sheds an important light on what the “undue hardship” 
analysis entails. Referred to as the “interactive process,” the process of deciding 
whether an accommodation is reasonable includes determining: (1) whether an 
individual let his or her employer know that she needs an adjustment or change 
at work for a reason related to a medical condition, and (2) whether the employer 
demonstrated reasonable efforts to assist and communicate with the employee 
in good faith regarding the employee’s needs and request.77 A significant piece 
in this “interactive process” includes an evaluation and determination of 
employer’s conduct and whether the employer made a good faith effort to 
 
resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation, the number of 
persons employed at such facility, and the effect on expenses and resources; (iii) The overall financial resources 
of the covered entity, the overall size of the business of the covered entity with respect to the number of its 
employees, and the number, type and location of its facilities; (iv) The type of operation or operations of the 
covered entity, including the composition, structure and functions of the workforce of such entity, and the 
geographic separateness and administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the 
covered entity; and (v) The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the impact 
on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility’s ability to conduct 
business.”). 
 74 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable 
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Number 915.002 (Oct. 17, 
2002). 
 75 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002); see also The U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission: EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Number 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002). 
 76 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 77 Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (Oct. 17, 2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#requesting; see 
also Tiffani L. McDonough, Implementing the Interactive Process under the ADA, ABA (Oct. 16, 2013), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/employment/articles/fall2013-1013-implementing-
interactive-process-under-ada.html. 
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accommodate the employee’s needs.78 While the interactive process is not 
expressly spelled out in statute, courts recognize that the obligation of an 
employer to engage in an interactive process with an employee is inherent in the 
statutory obligation to offer a reasonable accommodation to an otherwise 
qualified disabled employee.79 Accordingly, since an evaluation of an 
employer’s good faith effort to make an accommodation occurs during the 
reasonable accommodation inquiry, no evaluation of the employer’s conduct 
occurs in the undue hardship determination. Instead, the undue hardship analysis 
focuses on discerning whether the accommodation discussed in the interactive 
process causes the employer “significant difficulty or expense” in light of the 
factors found in the regulation.80 
The Supreme Court clarified and affirmed that there is a distinction in the 
analysis between a reasonable accommodation effort, which requires a good 
faith effort on the part of an employer to make an accommodation, and the undue 
hardship inquiry, which an employer can use as a defense to making such an 
accommodation, in US Airways v. Barnett.81 In Barnett, the Court considered 
whether the ADA required an employer to allow an employee with a disability 
to be employed in a position as a reasonable accommodation when another 
employee was entitled to that position under the employer’s seniority system.82 
U.S. Airways argued that an accommodation that required an exception to a 
seniority system always showed that the accommodation was not reasonable.83 
On the other hand, Barnett argued that an exception to a seniority system never 
showed that an accommodation was not reasonable, but it could help show that 
the accommodation would cause undue employer hardship, which the employer 
would have to show.84 The Court debated the merits of each argument and 
determined that the decision depended on how the phrase reasonable 
accommodation was reconciled with the phrase undue hardship. In the holding, 
the Court determined that first an employee needed to show the accommodation 
 
 78 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary 
for [the employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with [the employee] in need of the accommodation. 
This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable 
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”); see also Marcia L. DePaula, ADA: Are You 
Participating In The Interactive Process In “Good Faith”?, STEPTONE & JOHNSON PLLC (Apr. 21, 2016), 
http://www.steptoe-johnson.com/content/ada-are-you-participating-interactive-process-good-faith. 
 79 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1127 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 80 See 29 CRF 1630.2. 
 81 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (finding that employee did not present evidence of 
special circumstances demonstrating reasonableness). 
 82 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 393–94. 
 83 Id. at 396. 
 84 Id. 
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seemed “reasonable on its face.”85 After that, the employer must show special 
circumstances in light of the employee’s circumstances that indicate the 
existence of an undue hardship.86 Justice O’Connor concurred with the 
distinction between the two inquires, stating that “these interpretations give 
appropriate meaning to both the term “reasonableness” and “undue hardship” 
preventing the concepts from overlapping by making reasonableness a general 
inquiry and undue hardship a specific inquiry.”87 
Since this decision, case law has continued to illustrate the difference 
between a reasonable accommodation effort and undue hardship analysis. For 
example, in Ace v. Armstrong Utilities, the court denied an employer’s motion 
for summary judgment on a failure to accommodate a claim under the ADA.88 
In discussing the issue of the case, the court made clear that the issue was 
whether the employer made a good-faith effort to accommodate to the employee 
and expressly rejected any disputes about undue hardship given the finding that 
the employee’s request to work in a cubicle to accommodate his mental 
condition would not have imposed an undue hardship on the employer.89 The 
way the court distinguished these two issues in the case supports the conclusion 
that an evaluation into an individual’s good faith efforts or conduct is a condition 
that is separate and distinct from the condition of undue hardship.  
Another case example, Yinger v. Postal Presort, involved a former employee 
who had a heart condition that required a pacemaker who was terminated after 
taking leave for a procedure to replace the pacemaker’s battery.90 The employee 
established that he had an ADA qualified disability because his heart condition 
interfered with his ability to lift, stand, and walk distances.91 The court found 
that the employee had a conversation with his employer that constituted an 
adequate request for reasonable accommodations given his heart problems.92 
The court affirmed that the conversation, referred to as the interactive process, 
involved an obligation by both parties to proceed in an interactive manner and 
engage in good faith communications to identify a reasonable accommodation.93 
Upon evaluating the conduct and good faith efforts of the employer, the court 
found that the employer failed to participate in an interactive process to 
 
 85 Id. at 401–02. 
 86 Id. at 401–02. 
 87 Id. at 410–11 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 88 Ace v. Armstrong Utils., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23168, at *1 (W.D. Pa., Feb. 25, 2016). 
 89 Id. at *82–83. 
 90 Yinger v. Postal Presort, Inc., 693 Fed. Appx. 768, 770–71 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 91 Id. at 772. 
 92 Id. at 773. 
 93 Id. 
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determine reasonable accommodations after an employee had made his 
accommodation request.94 The court then went on to evaluate the employer’s 
undue hardship claim, which it ultimately rejected due to inconsistent and 
contradictory explanations for why the employee was no longer employed at the 
company.95 The fact that the court reviewed the employee’s reasonable 
accommodation claim and the employer’s undue hardship claim separately 
further supports the conclusion individual’s good faith efforts or conduct is a 
condition that is separate and distinct from the condition of undue hardship. 
Instead, as described by the statute, evaluating whether an undue hardship exists 
means focusing on the current nature and resources of the employer and 
determining whether imposing a duty to make the accommodation will result in 
significant difficulty or expense. 
A similar use of the phrase undue hardship is used in the Civil Rights Act as 
a defense for employers regarding the accommodation of an employee’s 
religious practices. The Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination 
based on religion, and the statute defines religion as including “all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or 
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship 
on the conduct of the employer’s business.”96 The regulation implementing the 
law sheds light on the undue hardship standard as used in this context by 
providing two examples of undue hardship, including cost and a disruption to 
seniority rights.97  
When it comes to cost as an undue hardship, 29 CFR 1605.2 provides that 
“an employer may assert undue hardship to justify a refusal to accommodate an 
employee’s need to be absent from his or her scheduled duty hours if the 
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would require ‘more than a 
de minimis cost.’”98 The regulation goes on to specify that “the analysis of what 
constitutes ‘more than a de minimis cost’ weighs the identifiable cost in relation 
to the size and operating cost of the employer, and the number of individuals 
 
 94 Id. at 773–74 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding that “rather than engaging an interactive process with Yinger, 
the employer appears to have done just the opposite, expressly telling Postal Presort’s human resources 
professional to stay silent and communicate nothing to Yinger regarding his leave request”) (citing Midland 
Brake, 180 F.3d 1154, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Bartee v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 916 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (employer’s failure to participate in interactive process supported failure-to-accommodate claim). 
 95 Yinger v. Postal Presort, Inc., 693 Fed. Appx. at 774. 
 96 42 U.SC.S. § 2000e(j). 
 97 16 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e). 
 98 Id. (emphasis added). 
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who will in fact need a particular accommodation.”99 While this is admittedly a 
very different standard than the definition used by the ADA, an important 
similarity exists: the analysis makes a distinction between a reasonable 
accommodation effort, which requires a good faith effort on the part of an 
employer to make an accommodation, and the undue hardship inquiry, which an 
employer can use as a defense to making said accommodation.  
Once an individual provides an employer with notice of the need to 
accommodate a particular religious practice or belief, both the employer and the 
individual have an obligation to engage in an interactive process to determine 
whether an accommodation is possible.100 Similar to the interactive process in 
the ADA context, the individual has an obligation to identify those employment 
practices or rules that interfere with his or her religious belief so that the 
employer can assess whether an accommodation is available. The “employer 
then has the obligation to consider, in good faith, whether an accommodation is 
possible and whether such accommodation poses an undue hardship to its 
business operations.”101 
The Supreme Court has provided some clarity to the undue hardship standard 
in the context of employment discrimination in Trans World Airlines v. 
Hardison, a case that involved an employee who requested Sundays off from 
work for religious purposes, thus overriding the seniority system the airline had 
for determining work schedules.102 The employee suggested multiple 
accommodations in light of his observance of the Sabbath, but the options were 
rejected by Trans World Airlines.103 No accommodation was reached and the 
employee was eventually fired for failing to report to work during his assigned 
shift.104 The Court affirmed the district court finding that Trans World Airlines 
took appropriate action to try accommodate the employee by holding several 
meetings in an attempt to find a solution.105  
The next part of the Court’s analysis, however, focused on the effect that 
honoring the accommodations as discussed in the meeting would have on the 
company, including the undue hardship the company would face in light of the 
 
 99 Id. (emphasis added). 
 100 See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986). 
 101 Peter T. Shapiro, Examining the Duty to Provide Religious Accommodations, LEXIS PRACTICE 
ADVISOR J. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/the-journal/b/lpa/posts/ 
examining-the-duty-to-provide-religious-accommodations. 
 102 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 64–65 (1977). 
 103 See id. at 65. 
 104 See id. 
 105 See id. at 77. 
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accommodations that were discussed in the meetings. In other words, the court 
was engaging in the undue hardship inquiry separate from its evaluation of the 
interactive process and Trans World Airline’s conduct and good faith efforts to 
find an accommodation to suit the employee’s needs. In its undue hardship 
analysis, the Supreme Court found where the employer would have incurred a 
cost of $150.00 in premium wages for a period of three months to arrange 
substitutes for the employee who could not work because of his religion, a 
showing of undue hardship was met, and accordingly, no accommodation was 
required.106 It was also in this case that the Supreme Court spelled out the 
threshold of an undue hardship, holding that an “undue hardship” must require 
an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating the religious 
needs of an employee.107 Under this approach, any accommodation that requires 
the employer to incur more than a slight cost would likely constitute 
an undue hardship based on the current nature and resources of the business and 
relieve the employer from making the accommodation. 
Case law has continued to illustrate the difference between a reasonable 
accommodation effort and undue hardship analysis in the context of religious 
accommodation in the employment context. In another example, Thomas v. 
National Association of Letter Carriers, plaintiff was a postal employee whose 
religion required a day of rest on its Sabbath. However, plaintiff worked in a 
position in which he did not have Saturdays fixed as a day off and likely could 
not get the day off due to the seniority system.108 Plaintiff was disciplined for 
failing to show up to work when he was scheduled on Saturdays and eventually 
was terminated.109 Plaintiff sued alleging that defendant had violated Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against him based on religion. The 
court affirmed the appropriate analysis by explaining that once a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate 
that an accommodation would cause undue hardship to the employer, supporting 
the conclusion that the reasonable accommodations inquiry and undue hardship 
inquiries are distinct.110 After finding that plaintiff did make a prima facie case, 
the court engaged in an evaluation of the employee’s requested 
accommodations, all of which the court found would have violated the post 
office’s shift schedule as governed by the union.111 The then court held that the 
post office’s actions constitute all that is reasonably required of an employer to 
 
 106 432 U.S. at 84. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Thomas v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 109 See id. at 1153–54. 
 110 See id. at 1155–56. 
 111 See id. at 1156. 
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accommodate the employee’s religion, citing the shift schedule violation as an 
undue hardship to the business.112 As such, the post office met its burden.  
In the event that an employer engages with an employee in good faith effort 
regarding an accommodation, but the employee rejects the reasonable 
accommodation, the undue hardship analysis becomes irrelevant, further 
demonstrating the distinct nature between an evaluation of good faith conduct 
and undue hardship. In Cosme v. Henderson, a plaintiff, also a postal office 
worker, accepted an employment position knowing that he would not have 
Saturdays fixed as a day off even though his religion required a day of rest on 
Saturdays, its Sabbath.113 In focusing on the reasonable accommodation portion 
of the analysis, the court elaborated that a reasonable accommodation of an 
employee’s religion is one that “eliminates the conflict between employment 
requirements and religious practices.”114 The court went on to say that process 
of finding a reasonable accommodation is intended to be an interactive process 
in which both the employer and employee participate.115 If the employer shows 
that it made a good faith effort to accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs, 
it has satisfied its obligations under Title VII, and the statutory inquiry ends.116 
Here, the post office had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that 
it made good faith efforts to provide a reasonable accommodate for the 
employee.117 As a result, the court found the employer’s argument about undue 
hardship irrelevant since there is no obligation for an employer to show undue 
hardship when the employer has offered other reasonable accommodations but 
it was the employee who rejected the reasonable accommodation.118  
Evaluating how undue hardship is applied in the employment context is 
valuable for understanding what an undue hardship analysis entails and how it 
is distinct from any good faith inquiry as suggested by the Supreme Court. The 
undue hardship analysis in this context contains factors intended to discern an 
employer’s ability to make accommodations based on existing resources and 
nature of the business. While the thresholds for what ultimately constitutes an 
undue hardship vary from the ADA to the Civil Rights Act, the important point 
is that undue hardship analysis focuses on current circumstances and evaluates 
 
 112 See id. 
 113 Thomas v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149. 
 114 Cosme v. Henderson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16210 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000) (citing Ansonia Bd. of 
Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986)). 
 115 Id. at *2. 
 116 Id. at *15. 
 117 Id. at *16. 
 118 Cosme v. Henderson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16210. 
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the impact to an employer if they are required to make the requested 
accommodation. 
D. Eligibility for Title IV Federal Student Aid 
Moving beyond the enlightening use of undue hardship in the ADA and Civil 
Rights Act context, it is notable that the undue hardship standard is used in the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 in eligibility requirements for Title IV federal 
student aid. Here, Congress uses the undue hardship standard as a student 
defense for failing to make Satisfactory Academic Progress for eligibility 
purposes for Title IV federal student aid.119 If a student can show that an undue 
hardship has caused them to fail to achieve Satisfactory Academic Progress, they 
can continue to receive their financial aid. According to 20 U.S.C. § 1091(c)(3), 
“any institution of higher education at which the student is in attendance may 
waive the provisions of paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of this subsection for 
undue hardship based on the death of a relative of the student, the personal injury 
or illness of the student, or special circumstances as determined by the 
institution.” The analysis as to whether a student can make an appeal asserting 
undue hardship in order to remain eligible for federal student aid begins with an 
inquiry of whether the student is making Satisfactory Academic Progress. With 
federal guidance, institutions are allowed to establish reasonable standards for 
measuring whether a student is making Satisfactory Academic Progress, and it 
is within these standards where student conduct and performance is evaluated as 
it relates to the student’s academic progress.120 For example, University of 
Virginia School of Law’s Satisfactory Academic Progress Policy lays out 
quantitative and qualitative factors to measure student performance, such as 
maximum time frame to complete a course of study, credit hour completion rate, 
and cumulative grade point average.121 Trinity Washington University explains 
that the relationship between Satisfactory Academic Progress and Financial Aid 
is about objective numbers, meaning the student’s cumulative GPA or credit 
completion rate, rather than a student’s “good faith effort” to do well in a course 
regardless of cumulative GPA.122  
After considering student performance data to determine that a student has 
failed to make Satisfactory Academic Progress, an appeal can be made by the 
 
 119 20 U.S.C. § 1091(c)(3). 
 120 Univ. of Va. L. Sch., Satisfactory Academic Progress (SAP), https://content.law.virginia.edu/ 
financialaid/satisfactory-academic-progress-sap (last visited Feb. 28, 2018). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Trinity Washington University, Probationary Advising, http://www.trinitydc.edu/cas-advising/files/ 
2011/09/Early_Alert__Probationary_Advising.pptx. 
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student by providing a detailed explanation of the undue hardship they are facing 
that has affected their ability to meet Satisfactory Academic Progress standards. 
Section 1091(c)(3) lays out circumstances that constitute an undue hardship.123 
The appeals are then reviewed by a committee within the institution to determine 
whether the student’s situation fits the statutorily recognized circumstances 
qualifying as an undue hardship. While there is no case law evaluating these 
committee appeal decisions interpreting “undue hardship,” an evaluation of 
various university satisfactory academic progress policies make clear that the 
relevant inquiry involves evaluating the student’s explanation and 
documentation of the circumstances surrounding their inability to maintain 
satisfactory progress and determining whether the circumstance fits in the 
statutory bases of hardship established by Congress. Many universities have 
tacked on an additional requirement to the appeal process requiring students to 
explain corrective measures they have or will take to achieve and maintain 
satisfactory academic progress or an explanation of what has changed in the 
situation that will allow the student to make satisfactory process going 
forward.124 This additional requirement essentially equates to a good faith 
statement by the student that she will take steps to achieve satisfactory progress 
if given a second chance to receive financial aid, but it is important to note that 
this requirement of pledging future good faith effort does not exist in the statute 
and is viewed as a distinct inquiry from determining whether an event has 
occurred in a student’s life that meets one of the statutory bases of undue 
hardship.125 Accordingly, the undue hardship defense in this provision, as 
defined by Congress, only refers to an evaluation of the immediate extenuating 
circumstances resulting in the student’s undue hardship to determine whether 
the student should be able to maintain their financial aid award. 
E. Defense and Extension of Time for Paying Taxes 
While one may think it would be particularly useful to evaluate how the 
undue hardship standard is used in the Internal Revenue Code given the 
 
 123 20 U.S.C. § 1091(c)(3). 
 124 See Emory Univ., Satisfactory Academic Progress, http://studentaid.emory.edu/eligibility/sap/.index. 
html; Wayne State Univ., Satisfactory Academic Progress, https://wayne.edu/financial-aid/receiving/sap/; Univ. 
of Va. L. Sch., Satisfactory Academic Progress, https://content.law.virginia.edu/financialaid/satisfactory-
academic-progress-sap.  
 125 See Univ. of Va. L. Sch., Satisfactory Academic Progress (SAP), https://content.law.virginia.edu/ 
financialaid/satisfactory-academic-progress-sap (last visited Feb. 28, 2018); Alabama A&M Univ., Satisfactory 
Academic Progress and Appeal Policy, http://www.aamu.edu/Admissions/fincialaid/importantinformation/ 
Pages/Satisfactory-Academic-Progress-Policy.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2018); Harv. Univ. Sch. of Public 
Health, Satisfactory Academic Progress Policy, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/osfs/sap/ (last visited Feb. 28, 
2018). 
BYKERKCOMMENTPROOFS_7.2.19 7/2/2019 2:12 PM 
532 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 35 
companionship between it and the Bankruptcy Code,126 my analysis finds that 
the application of undue hardship in this context is subject to some of the same 
inconsistent interpretations and determinations as experienced in the Bankruptcy 
Code. The undue hardship standard is used in the Internal Revenue Code as a 
defense for failing to pay taxes on time. If a taxpayer can show that paying his 
or her taxes on time would have caused an undue hardship, he or she may be 
eligible for an extension of time to pay taxes. Specifically, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6161(b)(1) governs provisions allowing an extension of time for paying taxes 
and provides that “an extension under this paragraph may be granted only where 
it is shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary that payment of a deficiency upon 
the date fixed for the payment thereof will result in undue hardship to the 
taxpayer” in the case of certain taxes.127  
26 C.F.R. 301.6651-1 governs the “additions to tax” penalties for 
underpayment of taxes and sets forth the “reasonable cause” requirements a 
taxpayer must meet to be able to avoid such penalty assessments for unpaid 
taxes. The relevant regulation provides that: 
a failure to pay will be considered to be due to reasonable cause to the 
extent that the taxpayer has made a satisfactory showing that he 
exercised ordinary business care and prudence in providing for 
payment of his tax liability and was nevertheless either unable to pay 
the tax or would suffer an undue hardship if he paid on the due date.128  
To determine whether the taxpayer was unable to pay the tax in spite of the 
“exercise of ordinary business care and prudence in providing for payment of 
his tax liability,” consideration is given to the facts and circumstances of the 
taxpayer’s financial situation, including the amount and nature of the taxpayer’s 
expenditures in light of the income he could, at the time of such expenditures, 
reasonably expect to receive prior to the date prescribed for the payment of the 
tax.129 
These provisions serve as the basis of the Internal Revenue Service’s Fresh 
Start initiative, which uses the undue hardship standard to determine the 
eligibility of individuals who may participate in the initiative to request an 
extension of time to pay their IRS tax payments and have their late payment 
 
 126 For example, the definition of a qualified student loan for purposes of describing a non-dischargeable 
student loan in the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B)) expressly cross-references the Internal Revenue 
Code’s definition of a qualified student loan (26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(1)). 
 127 26 U.S.C. § 6161(b)(1). 
 128 26 C.F.R. 301.6651-1. 
 129 Id. 
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penalties waived, all with the goal of helping relieve individuals of their IRS 
debt.130 The option of receiving an extension of time and having late payment 
penalties waived is reserved only for taxpayers who would experience “undue 
hardship” if forced to pay their taxes by the due date.131 The U.S. Code further 
clarifies the undue hardship standard as used in tax context by defining undue 
hardship “as more than an inconvenience to the taxpayer” and specifying that it 
must appear that a “substantial financial loss” will result to the taxpayer from 
making payment on the due date.132 An example of an undue hardship as 
provided in federal regulations includes selling property at a loss to pay taxes on 
the due date.133 To participate in the IRS’s fresh start initiative or general 
application for an extension of time for repayment of taxes due to an undue 
hardship, a debtor must prove that she will suffer a significant financial loss if 
she pays her tax on the due date.134 This is accomplished by providing the IRS 
with a detailed explanation through the IRS’s Application for Extension of Time 
for Payment of Tax Due to Undue Hardship form.135  
To demonstrate an undue hardship that warrants an extension in time to pay 
taxes, it is necessary for a taxpayer to provide the IRS with certain factual 
information that allows the IRS to make a determination on whether an undue 
hardship exists and whether an extension of time to pay is warranted.136 Without 
public access to IRS approvals or denials for an extension of time to pay taxes, 
it is impossible to know what factors the government finds significant in 
showing substantial financial loss that constitutes an undue hardship. In the 
event that IRS decisions are reviewed by the federal judiciary, the facts and 
circumstances that courts want to see that constitute an undue hardship to justify 
a time extension widely vary, similar to bankruptcy proceedings where courts 
 
 130 USTaxCenter, IRS Options If You Cannot Pay Your Taxes, https://www.irs.com/articles/irs-options-
if-you-cannot-pay-your-taxes. 
 131 Id. 
 132 26 U.S.C. § 6161(b)(1); see also Application for Extension of Time for Payment of Tax Due to Undue 
Hardship, I. R. S. Pub. No. 1127 (Dec. 2011), https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1127 (defining undue 
hardship as a term that “means more than an inconvenience. You must show you will have a substantial financial 
loss (such as selling property at a sacrifice price) if you pay your tax on the date it is due.”). 
 133 26 C.F.R. 1.6161-1 (“It must appear that substantial financial loss, for example, loss due to the sale of 
property at a sacrifice price, will result to the taxpayer for making payment on the due date of the amount with 
respect to which the extension is desired. If a market exists, the sale of property at the current market price is 
not ordinarily considered as resulting in an undue hardship.”). 
 134 Application for Extension of Time for Payment of Tax Due to Undue Hardship, I. R. S. Pub. No. 1127, 
(Dec. 2011), https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1127 (last updated Jan. 29, 2019).  
 135 Id. 
 136 Baccei v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50687, at *21–22 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2008) (finding 
that plaintiff’s request failed to provide an adequate statement of all the “facts and circumstances” explaining 
why a denial of the extension would result in hardship to the estate). 
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are determining whether an undue hardship exists for purposes of discharging 
education debt through bankruptcy.  
For example, the type of information the court in Baccei v. United States 
recommended be in the extension request form for extension of time to pay 
estate taxes included the total amount of liquid assets that the plaintiff claimed 
would be available to pay the tax once the bank had approved the release of 
funds, whether any assets were available to pay some portion of the tax at the 
time it was due, when the plaintiff anticipated that sufficient assets would 
become available, and whether plaintiff had explored other means of obtaining 
the funds, such as selling the real property prior to the payment due date.137 The 
district court that prescribed these recommendations did not go on to explain 
how these factors are evaluated and whether certain factors carry more or less 
weight than others. Despite these highly individualized factors, it is worth noting 
that the taxpayer’s current financial circumstances are the primary inquiry and 
really any fact or circumstance can suffice if it shows that being forced to pay a 
tax on the due date would sustain a substantial financial loss. 
When it comes to evaluating undue hardship for purposes of determining 
whether reasonable cause was exercised to justify the waiver of additions to tax 
for unpaid taxes, judicial review has shed more light on what constitutes an 
undue hardship and how a showing of undue hardship fits in the larger 
“reasonable cause” requirement.138 A leading case on this topic comes from the 
Ninth Circuit in Synergy Staffing v. United States, in which the court held that 
“evidence of financial trouble, without more, is not enough” to establish undue 
hardship and that a taxpayer seeking refund of penalties must “come forward 
with evidence of what funds it did have on hand when taxes were due,” and 
“produce evidence of how it spent those funds in lieu of paying its taxes.”139 
Some district courts have interpreted this holding to mean that waivers of 
additions to tax for unpaid taxes rests on “the reasonableness of the taxpayer’s 
decision not to pay at the time the tax was due, or, in other words, whether the 
taxpayer provided sufficient evidence to establish that its decision not to pay the 
tax because of financial difficulties was reasonable.”140  
 
 137 Id. at *22–23. 
 138 Courts are, however, still split in how they evaluate a reasonable cause that excuses penalties for 
nonpayment of taxes. See St. Paul Cathedral Sch. v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98526, at *17–19 n.6 
(E.D. Wash. Dec. 5, 2008). 
 139 Babcock Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62741, at *22 (D.S.C. May 2, 2013) (citing 
Synergy Staffing, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 140 St. Paul Cathedral Sch., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98526, at *18. 
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To constitute an undue hardship, the facts and circumstances a taxpayer 
provides usually need to show that financial ruin is on the horizon. In In re 
Arthur’s Industrial Maintenance, the court found that the taxpayer carried its 
burden of establishing reasonable cause based on undue hardship when it 
decided to complete several large construction jobs instead of pay its obligations 
to the IRS because, if it had paid all withholding taxes when due, it would have 
been forced to shut down because it could not have afforded to pay for the labor 
and purchase the materials necessary to complete the jobs.141 The court’s 
analysis began with an inquiry into whether the debtor established reasonable 
cause for failing to timely pay and deposit his tax obligations.142 This inquiry 
involves a fact intensive evaluation of the individual’s reason for not paying his 
taxes. The court agreed with earlier precedent that a showing of undue hardship 
supports a finding of reasonable cause for not paying and that a taxpayer’s 
financial difficulties may, in appropriate circumstances, constitute reasonable 
cause for purposes of the regulation.143 As such, the court held that the debtor in 
this case clearly faced a hardship that was more than an inconvenience and that 
he established sufficient good faith to rebut any possible inference of willful 
neglect.144 Accordingly, the debtor carried its burden of establishing reasonable 
cause.145  
In another example, In re Pool & Varga, the court considered all facts and 
circumstances of the taxpayer’s financial situation, including the amount and 
nature of the taxpayer’s expenditures in light of the income he could, at the time 
of such expenditures, reasonably expect to receive prior to the date prescribed 
for the payment of the tax in order to determine whether the taxpayer was unable 
to pay the tax in spite of the exercise of ordinary business care and prudence in 
providing for payment of his tax liability.146 According to the court, a taxpayer 
is considered to have exercised “ordinary business care and prudence” if she 
made reasonable efforts to conserve sufficient assets in marketable form to 
satisfy his tax liability and nevertheless was unable to pay all or a portion of the 
tax when it became due.147 Here, the debtor met his burden of establishing that 
he had reasonable cause for not complying with the statute requiring payment of 
taxes, and therefore the court held that the penalty was improperly assessed. The 
court’s rationale touched on the fact that the debtor’s financial situation was such 
 
 141 In re Arthur’s Indus. Maint., 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 2339, at *18–20 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 1992). 
 142 Id. at *19–22. 
 143 Id. at *21. 
 144 Id. at *22. 
 145 Id. 
 146 In re Pool & Varga, Inc., 60 B.R. 722, 724–25 (E.D. Mich. 1986). 
 147 Id. 
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that his business would have been irreparably injured or terminated had it paid 
the taxes in full on the due date.148 A notable feature from this discussion of the 
undue hardship as a defense for failure to pay taxes is that the standard is subject 
to some of the same inconsistent interpretations and determinations as currently 
experienced in the Bankruptcy Code based on the highly discretionary nature of 
the decision-making process set forth by the IRS. Moreover, the private and fact-
intensive procedures the IRS uses to evaluate tax extensions and penalty waiver 
requests make it difficult to fully discern the relevant factors the agency uses to 
determine whether an undue hardship showing exists. Despite this, the 
taxpayer’s current financial circumstances are the key focus and any factor the 
IRS evaluates is intended to discern whether the individual would have sustained 
a substantial financial loss had they been forced to pay their taxes on the due 
date. In other words, the IRS is concerned with the future livelihood of the 
taxpayer if she is forced to pay taxes based on current circumstances. 
F. Supplemental Security Income Defense 
There is one place in federal law, besides the reaffirmation agreement 
provision in the Bankruptcy Code, where undue hardship is defined by a bright-
line test, and that test exists in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program 
and provides a defense for an individual that transferred resources for less than 
fair market value while they were being considered for eligibility and such a 
denial of eligibility causes them an undue hardship. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. 
1382(b) provides that if an individual disposes of resources for less than fair 
market value before, on or after applying for benefits, the individual is ineligible 
for benefits for a certain amount of time unless that “the denial of eligibility 
would work an undue hardship as determined on the basis of criteria established 
by the Commissioner.”149 The regulation implementing the regulation states that 
an undue hardship exists when “[a]n individual alleges that failure to receive SSI 
benefits would deprive the individual of food or shelter; and the applicable 
Federal benefit rate (plus the federally-administered State supplementary 
payment level) exceeds the sum of: The individual’s monthly countable and 
excludable income and monthly countable and excludable liquid resources.”150  
By the time an SSI applicant’s undue hardship state is evaluated, the conduct 
that has essentially put the individual at risk for becoming ineligible for benefits 
has already been considered and is therefore not a part of the undue hardship 
 
 148 In re Pool & Varga, Inc., 60 B.R. at 728. 
 149 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382b(c)(1)(A)(i); 1382b(c)(C)(iv). 
 150 20 C.F.R. § 416.1246. 
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inquiry. Instead, undue hardship is defined by a bright-line test regarding the 
individual’s current financial condition and the impact that denying benefits will 
have. Undue hardship in this context is met through a two-part test. First, to show 
that an individual can’t pay for shelter, he or she needs to show that he or she 
cannot afford any without an SSI check and that there is no other affordable 
housing available.151 Second, the individual must also show that his or her total 
available funds (income and liquid resources) is less than the monthly SSI 
amount for their respective state.152 This bright-line test provides clear support 
for the proposition that an undue hardship inquiry does not contemplate whether 
the cause of the hardship warrants the individual privy to supplemental security 
income or whether the individual’s good faith (or bad faith) warrants their access 
to the income. Instead, the undue hardship inquiry is ascertaining the effect that 
withholding the supplemental security income would have on the individual. In 
the event that Congress or courts would adopt a bright-line test to evaluate the 
discharge of student loans in bankruptcy, this standard warrants close 
consideration in how it aligns with my proposition that courts should focus on 
determining the effect that declaring the debt nondischargeable would have on 
the debtor and using that determination as a basis for whether bankruptcy relief 
is justified. 
G. Discovery in Litigation 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are a set of judicial procedures 
approved by Congress that govern civil proceedings in federal court. The undue 
hardship standard is used in the context of discovery, where each party can 
obtain information or evidence from the other party, and provides a defense to 
the discovery of certain information under the work product doctrine.153 Under 
Rule 26, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its 
representative.154 However, materials prepared in anticipation of litigation can 
be discovered if the party requesting the materials shows it has a “substantial 
need for the materials” and “cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their 
substantial equivalent by other means.”155  
 
 151 Social Security Administration, SI 01150.126 Exceptions—Undue Hardship, https://secure.ssa.gov/ 
poms.nsf/lnx/0501150126.  
 152 Id. 
 153 FED. R. CIV. P. 26.  
 154 FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 155 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(ii), 18 C.F.R. § 385.402(b); but see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B), 18 C.F.R. 
§ 385.402(b) (“In ordering any such discovery, the presiding officer will prevent disclosure of the mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney.”). 
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When a court evaluates a request for discovery, it first has to certify that the 
requested document or tangible thing is ordinary work product. Then, the party 
seeking discovery under rule 26(b)(3) must show that he or she has “substantial 
need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without 
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other 
means.”156 In seeking to establish undue hardship in this context, parties have to 
be prepared to show they have made an effort to obtain the sought after material 
and that all avenue of obtaining the material have been exhausted. For example, 
in Davis v. Emery Air Freight Corporation, an employee sought documents 
belonging to her employer regarding an internal investigation.157 The employer 
argued, however, that information sought by the plaintiff is available through 
depositions of the defendant’s employees.158 The court, pointing out that the 
record showed that the employee had only taken one deposition, held that the 
employee failed to demonstrate an undue hardship due to her inability to obtain 
the substantial equivalent of this evidence.159 Courts also require a high level of 
specificity, without speculation, when it comes to making claims for undue 
hardship. Additionally, as a general rule, inconvenience and expense do not 
constitute undue hardship.160 Other factors that courts use in determining 
substantial need and undue hardship include the importance of the materials to 
the preparation of the case, the difficulty in obtaining substantial equivalents to 
the desired materials, the use of the materials, the availability of alternative 
means of obtaining the desired information if discovery is denied, and the extent 
to which the asserted need is substantiated.161 
Rule 26 in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represents one area in federal 
law in which conduct and a good faith effort appear to play an important role in 
the undue hardship analysis. It is important to note that the presumption of 
consistent usage yields to context, and there is good reason to believe that a 
party’s conduct is very relevant in matters concerning discovery of materials 
used for litigation purposes and that an evaluation of individual conduct and a 
party’s “good faith” efforts are warranted in an analysis of whether a party is 
truly experiencing undue hardship to warrant discovery. The work product 
doctrine is known as an important tool for sheltering the mental processes of an 
 
 156 Jeff Anderson, et. al., Special Project: The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 798 
(1983). 
 157 Davis v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 212 F.R.D. 432 (2003). 
 158 Id. at 436. 
 159 Id. at 437. 
 160 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, Civil Practice and Litigation Techniques in Federal and 
State Courts, Course Number: SL081. 
 161 Id. 
BYKERKCOMMENTPROOFS_7.2.19 7/2/2019 2:12 PM 
2019] STUDENT LOAN DISCHARGE 539 
attorney by providing a privileged area within which he or she can analyze and 
prepare his client’s case.162 It is essential to the legal profession that various 
duties are completed with a certain degree of privacy that is free from 
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.163 Another purpose 
of the work product doctrine “is to establish a zone of privacy for strategic 
litigation planning and to prevent one party from piggybacking on the 
adversary’s preparation.”164 Accordingly, a logical argument can be made that 
that this varying use of undue hardship exists when such important issues are at 
risk when it comes to disclosure of work product in the legal profession. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Considering the substantial relief the bankruptcy system can provide to 
individuals with burdensome educational debt, and the problems with the current 
interpretation of the undue hardship which determines whether educational debt 
is dischargeable through bankruptcy, a reconceptualization of how the “undue 
hardship” standard is interpreted in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) is necessary. An 
important point that this reconceptualization must address is the ambiguity or 
vagueness that Congress left in the Bankruptcy Code when employing the 
“undue hardship” standard in the student loan context.  
One of the most viable ways to construe “undue hardship” in the bankruptcy 
context is to approach the phrase with an appreciation of continuity in the law 
under the principles and canons discussed in this paper. Through this approach 
of analyzing the different uses of undue hardship as used throughout federal 
statutes, it is evident that the undue hardships standard concerns an individual’s 
current circumstances, financial or otherwise, and any factors used to determine 
whether an undue hardship exists should focus on ascertaining facts that help 
inform a decision-maker about the individual’s present situation. Since the 
assertion of an undue hardship is generally used as a defense or an exception, 
the undue hardship analysis should take into account the fate of an individual if 
he or she is denied relief through the undue hardship exception or defense. 
Any definition Congress or the executive branch provides to “undue 
hardship” in § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code should include factors that 
evaluate the future livelihood of the debtor if she is denied bankruptcy relief 
 
 162 Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, When Does Monitoring Defendants and Their Lawyers Cross 
the Line, 31 CRIM. JUST. 46, 47.  
 163 United States v. DeLeon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35177, *188 (D.N.M. Mar. 8, 2017). 
 164 United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1501 (2d Cir. 1995) (purpose of doctrine is to establish ‘‘zone 
of privacy’’). 
BYKERKCOMMENTPROOFS_7.2.19 7/2/2019 2:12 PM 
540 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 35 
based on the debtor’s current financial circumstances. Such a definition would 
not require an inquiry into a debtor’s good faith efforts to repay the loan based 
on prebankruptcy conduct because Congress has shown that it knows how to 
expressly require good faith in a distinct and separate manner from undue 
hardship. The fact that Congress has used the clause “acted in good faith” in 
conjunction with “undue hardship” in the reaffirmation agreement context in the 
Bankruptcy Code provides strong support for the proposition that when 
Congress drafts a statute with the undue hardship standard, undue hardship alone 
does not include an inquiry into a debtor’s good faith.165 This proposition is only 
strengthened by the reasonable accommodation analysis used in conjunction 
with the undue hardship inquiry in the employment discrimination context, 
where a distinction was made between the two inquiries by the Supreme 
Court.166  
An undue hardship definition should also emphasize the need for courts to 
focus on the debtor’s current financial situation without undue regard to pre-
bankruptcy conduct or assurance of persisting financial distress. When courts 
assess an employer’s claim of undue hardship as a defense for making 
accommodations for an employee, they assess factors that relate to the nature 
and financial resources of an employer at the time the employee makes the 
accommodation request.167 Likewise, when a university is assessing a student’s 
eligibility for federal financial aid when the student has failed to make 
satisfactory academic progress, they are evaluating facts to support a finding of 
undue hardship related to an extenuating circumstance that has caused the 
student to fail to make satisfactory in a given semester.168 When a taxpayer fails 
to pay their taxes on the due date, the IRS makes a primary inquiry into what 
resources and assets the taxpayer had available on the date the taxes were due to 
determine whether an undue hardship would have occurred had the taxes been 
paid.169 The bright-line test for undue hardship in the context of Supplemental 
Security Income includes factors that ascertain an individual’s total available 
funds for the month that undue hardship is alleged.170 For the bankruptcy 
context, these definitions and applications of undue hardship underscore the 
importance of drafting a definition that includes factors that objectively discern 
 
 165 11 U.S.C. § 524.  
 166 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (2002). 
 167 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B). 
 168 20 U.S.C. § 1091(c)(3). 
 169 26 C.F.R. 301.6651-1. 
 170 Social Security Administration, Program Operations Manuel System, SI 01150.126 Exceptions—
Undue Hardship, https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0501150126.  
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debtor’s current financial situation at the time of filing for bankruptcy to 
determine whether an undue hardship exists. 
After discerning a debtor’s current financial situation, courts have to 
ascertain whether the financial circumstances warrant discharge of student 
loans. To do this, any definition proposed by Congress should include factors 
that evaluate the future livelihood of the debtor. The thresholds for what 
ultimately constitute an undue hardship vary among the different applications of 
the standard. Nevertheless, the application of the undue hardship standard in any 
context includes an inquiry into the livelihood of the individual if she is denied 
relief through the undue hardship exception or defense. For example, when 
courts assess an employer’s claim of undue hardship as a defense for making 
accommodations for an employee, a relevant factor is the impact on the facility’s 
ability to conduct business if the court requires the accommodation to be 
made.171 When courts are evaluating whether an undue hardship exists for a 
business that is late paying taxes, facts that show imminent financial ruin 
indicate undue hardship.172 The SSI undue hardship formula also emphasizes the 
need for the IRS to be cognizant of the effect not receiving the benefits would 
have on the individual based on the formula’s inquiry into whether an individual 
would have food or shelter without the benefits.173 Any definition that guides 
the undue hardship analysis in the bankruptcy context should also account for 
the importance of considering the livelihood of the debtor if the court decides 
her educational debt is not dischargeable.  
It is important to remember that the presumption of consistent usage yields 
to context, and that in the context of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, there is an implied inquiry into a party’s good faith effort when 
evaluating whether a party can obtain a substantial equivalent of the requested 
trial materials without undue hardship.174 The work-product doctrine has 
important implications in the American litigation system, which may warrant a 
valid justification for using the undue hardship standard in a different way to fit 
the context and purpose of the rule.175 The same justifications do not exist in the 
 
 171 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2008); see also Gilbert v. Frank, 949F.2d 637, 643–44 (2nd Cir. 1991) 
(affirming the dismissal of the complaint, in part, because making the employee’s requested accommodation 
would slow down and reduce the productivity of the operation). 
 172 See In re Arthur’s Indus. Maint., 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 2339, at *18–19 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 1992); 
In re Pool & Varga, Inc., 60 B.R. 722, 724–25 (E.D. Mich. 1986). 
 173 20 C.F.R. § 416.1246.  
 174 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A). 
 175 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (finding that providing materials prepared for trial to 
opposing counsel would result in inefficiency and unfairness, which would have a demoralizing effect on the 
legal profession and result in the interests of clients and the cause of justice being poorly served). 
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Bankruptcy Code context, however. Instead, the bankruptcy system, and the 
individuals it serves, would benefit from a reconceptualization of undue 
hardship that includes a focus on a debtor’s current circumstances and considers 
the livelihood of the debtor if his or her debt is not discharged. Including these 
considerations in a definition of undue hardship in the Bankruptcy Code moves 
the bankruptcy system in a positive direction by focusing the court’s inquiry into 
the circumstances that warrant an undue hardship determination. A definition 
that focuses a court’s inquiry into what constitutes an undue hardship is an 
important step toward achieving consistent judicial determinations and 
mitigating arbitrary judicial subjectivity. 
IV. POLICY REASONS FOR RECONCEPTUALIZING UNDUE HARDSHIP 
Important policy reasons exist for reconceptualizing undue hardship in a way 
that is consistent with how the standard is used in other federal law contexts. 
First, since the current undue hardship test gives way to judicial subjectivity and 
arbitrary results, encouraging courts to focus on the effect that declaring a debt 
nondischargable would have on a debtor, instead of focusing on whether the 
cause of hardship warrants the discharge of the debt or good faith efforts or 
conduct a debtor did prior to bankruptcy, allows bankruptcy courts to take a 
more uniform approach in determining whether to discharge a debtor’s student 
loan debt. There is a danger involved in having the meaning of undue hardship 
determined by the principles and standards of the judge because “uncertainty 
and unequal treatment of debtors” will inevitably occur.176 While it is reasonable 
to allow judges to have the discretion to act on a case-by-case basis where 
Congress has spoken broadly or generally, such as it has in describing “undue 
hardship,” it is problematic when “notwithstanding the guideposts left for judges 
to figure out the proper path of undue hardship, many have gotten it wrong.”177 
In this way, it is justified to be concerned about the danger of discretion and the 
ability it has to “undermine the integrity of the system by producing haphazard 
results that have compromised the fresh start principle.”178 Cognitive science 
based literature supports the idea that “[i]f judges premise their decision-making 
on the notion that there is some objective and universal perspective, they are 
ignoring fundamental principles of cognition.”179 As former Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court Benjamin Cardozo once wrote, “we may try to see things as 
 
 176 Pardo & Lacey, supra note 20, at 520. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Nicole Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and the Limits of Perception, 47 AKRON L. REV. 
693, 694 (2014). 
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objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes 
except our own.”180 
Proponents of a national definition contend that the undue hardship test 
should focus on the debtor’s actual ability to “afford to pay the debt,” which is 
exactly what a definition that focuses on a debtor’s current financial 
circumstances and on their future livelihood if they are not granted a discharge 
does. Moreover, the goal of uniformity in the law requires the consistent 
treatment of debtors in this area of bankruptcy. Accordingly, a definition guided 
by the considerations outlined in this Comment will help courts treat similarly 
situated debtors uniformly. This helps eliminate the current practice of treating 
debtors differently depending upon what circuit they reside in or which 
bankruptcy judge handles their case. It also avoids forum shopping problems 
and helps eliminate any diminishment in the public’s loss of faith in the 
bankruptcy laws because of their arbitrary or unpredictable nature. 
Second, there are significant economic reasons for allowing debtors with 
student loans to experience a fresh start. The costs of higher education and the 
associated student loan debt burdens carried by former students are “large drags 
on economic growth, social mobility, skills generation, and simply the well-
being of vast numbers of past, current, and future students.”181 For example, 
financial experts note that higher education debt burdens are disqualifying a 
generation of young graduates from home ownership.182 Many commentators 
argue that “to forgive student loan debt and return consumers debtors to normal 
economic life is an economic imperative.”183 Traditional bankruptcy theory 
supports the proposition that “society as a whole benefits by relieving the most 
hopeless debtors from their debt obligations.”184 By experiencing relief from 
debt obligations, “debtors are provided a ‘fresh start’ so they may resume their 
lives as responsible consumers and producers.”185 Accordingly, “discharge of 
debts in bankruptcy serves an important traditional function in the American 
economic order” and is considered “one of the few traditional safety nets amid 
an otherwise free market economy.”186  
 
 180 Id. (citing BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921)). 
 181 John Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher Education, 104 GEO. L.J. 
229, 232 (2016). 
 182 Zach Friedman, Have Student Loans Prevented you from Buying a Home?, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2019/01/18/student-loans-home-ownership/#4368aa133d22.  
 183 Austin, supra note 12, 414. 
 184 Roots, supra note 9, at 513. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
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There are also significant social reasons for reevaluating the undue hardship 
standard. There are several types of financial obligations that are excepted from 
discharge in bankruptcy, in which many, if not all, arise from moral culpability 
of the debtor. By making education debt non-dischargeable, Congress has 
equated student loan default with offenses like fraud, willful injury, and failure 
to pay child support. 187 Moreover, “[i]f a borrower incurred a student loan debt 
intending to not repay it, the debt would properly be non-dischargeable as a debt 
incurred by fraud.”188 
Last, the existing tests for undue hardship under § 523(a)(8) were developed 
in the context of an automatic discharge for seven-year-old student loans that 
could not be repaid.189 Now that undue hardship is the only way for debtors to 
seek discharge of student loans, there is scholarly consensus that courts should 
reassess and lower that standard. Defining undue hardship with an emphasis on 
the debtor’s current circumstances and considers the future livelihood of a debtor 
if he or she is denied discharge through bankruptcy is one way to update the 
standard by providing a realistic chance of proving undue hardship with a 
standard that reflects the current construction of the Bankruptcy Code and 
continuity in the law regarding undue hardship. 
CONCLUSION 
Access to higher education is largely shaped by federal law, and any actions 
and reforms that restrict access to higher education opportunity, or the benefits 
to be derived from obtaining a degree, deserve analysis and critique. This 
Comment is sensitive to the fact that bankruptcy should not be viewed as a 
means to finance higher education but takes the position that it should be an 
option for students burdened by cumbersome student loan amounts that are 
prohibiting them from enjoying the benefits of their education and contributing 
as productive members of society. Current interpretation and implementation of 
the “undue hardship” exception in the dischargeability assessment of 
educational debt serves as a substantial and concerning barrier for debtors that 
would otherwise meet eligibility requirements for bankruptcy relief.190 By 
 
 187 Austin, supra note 12, at 410.  
 188 Id. at 412. 
 189 See Tara Siegel Bernard, Judges Rebuke Limits on Wiping Out Student Loan Debt, N.Y. TIMES (July 
17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/18/your-money/student-loans/judges-rebuke-limits-on-wiping-
out-student-loan-debt.html. 
 190 See Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship 
Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 507 (2012) (arguing that “bleak reports” of the difficulty of student loan 
discharge “have produced a chilling effect that deters debtors.”). 
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evaluating the undue hardships standard in the context of public benefits 
employment discrimination, financial aid eligibility, tax payment extensions, 
and discovery in civil procedure, this Comment supports the conclusion that the 
primary inquiry into a debtor’s current financial circumstances without unduly 
regard to prebankruptcy conduct or assurance of persisting financial distress. 
The majority of the Circuit Courts’ current application of the undue hardship 
standard with a three-prong test including factors of good faith efforts to repay 
and a future inability to repay is at conflict with other statutory definitions and 
interpretations of “undue hardship” across federal law, which serves as a 
substantial barrier to allowing student debtors the opportunity to experience a 
“fresh start” free from encumbering and disabling debts that bankruptcy law 
seeks to provide. 
It is worth acknowledging the rationale behind excepting student loans from 
discharge through bankruptcy, and that the exception of student loans from 
discharge is prefaced on un-evidenced allegations of abuse and assumptions that 
student borrowers have bad intentions. Legislative history shows that the 
Bankruptcy Act Commission, established by Congress in 1970 to analyze and 
evaluate the then system of bankruptcy law, suggested an educational debt 
exception to discharge “in order to reinstate public confidence in the bankruptcy 
system.”191 Evidence was presented to the Commission that showed that less 
than one percent of federally insured student loans were discharged in 
bankruptcy, however the Commission still found it necessary to preempt 
“potential abuses.”192 After a series of amendments, educational debt was given 
a conditionally dischargeable status except if a showing of “undue hardship” 
exists. 
The courts across the country must adopt a unified standard that reflects 
three things: (1) Congress’s intent in inserting the “undue hardship” standard in 
the assessment of discharging educational debt, (2) the purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and (3) the need for consistency and fairness in the court 
system. Research on human cognition proves that judges bring various 
influences, such as age, gender, generation, religion, and values with them to the 
decision-making process when considering this like what constitutes an undue 
hardship.193 While there are many ways uniformity and consistency in the 
standard can be achieved, this Comment takes the position that tools of statutory 
interpretation provide an avenue for reconceptualizing “undue hardship” in light 
 
 191 Pardo & Lacey, supra note 20, at 420. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Negowetti, supra note 179, at 722–23. 
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of the use in the current majority test. By reconceptualizing the standard in a 
way that is consistent with the use of the standard throughout other sources of 
federal law, my hope is that bankruptcy courts will employ a standard that 
recognizes the value in obtaining higher education and delivers an equal 
opportunity for a “fresh start” from burdensome debt obligations to those who 
pursue higher education. 
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